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Kanaan and mcguire (2011) elegantly describe three challenges facing the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to uncover cognitive mechanisms. They 
show how these challenges ramify in the case of 
identifying the mechanisms responsible for psychi-
atric disorders. I want to raise another difficulty 
for fMRI that also seems to ramify in similar cases. 
This is that there are good reasons for doubting 
one of the assumptions on which many fMRI stud-
ies are based: that neural mechanisms are always 
and everywhere sufficient for cognition. I suggest 
that, in the case of the mechanisms underlying 
psychiatric disorders, this assumption should be 
doubted. I do not dispute that a malfunctioning 
neural mechanism is likely to be a necessary com-
ponent of a psychiatric disorder—as Kanaan and 
McGuire say, the experimental evidence from cog-
nitive neuropsychiatry gives us excellent reasons 
to think that this is so. My question is whether a 
story only in terms of these neural mechanisms is 
sufficient to explain the mechanism of a psychiatric 
disorder. Is the reduction, projected by cognitive 
neuropsychiatry, of psychiatric disorders to disor-
ders in neural functioning even in principle pos-
sible? Drawing on recent concerns about the loca-
tion of mental states, I argue that such a reduction 
is likely to fail. Even if the considerable problems 
raised by Kanaan and McGuire for fMRI could 
be addressed, we have no reason to think that the 
mechanisms involved in psychiatric disorders are 
entirely neural, and that fMRI, or even a perfect 
science-fiction brain scanner, would be capable 
of uncovering them. Psychiatric disorders, like 
numerous other cognitive processes, are liable to 
cross the brain-world boundary in such a promis-
cuous way as to be resistant to neural reduction.
As Kanaan and McGuire argue, part of the 
appeal of fMRI to psychiatry is that it offers the 
tantalizing prospect of putting psychiatry on a 
firm biomedical foundation: namely, mechanisti-
cally explaining psychiatric disorders in terms of 
functional brain disorders. In the ideal case, this 
would involve finding a neural mechanism respon-
sible for, sufficient for, or characteristic of, a given 
psychiatric disorder. A psychiatric patient could, 
say, be diagnosed with one or more malfunctioning 
cognitive mechanisms, which ultimately would be 
identified with a neural malfunction. The proposed 
identification would run in two steps. Mental 
disorders would first be characterized within the 
framework of cognitive psychology: in terms of 
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malfunctioning cognitive, perceptual, behavioral, 
systems. Then those systems would be identified 
with underlying brain structures and functions 
responsible for their action via imaging studies 
such as fMRI. Thus, fMRI would link our exist-
ing cognitive and behavioral characterization of 
mental disorders (patients that act, feel, or think 
in dysfunctional ways) with underlying neural 
mechanisms. If such a mechanistic reduction 
could be achieved, it would have the potential to 
dramatically increase our understanding of the 
nature of mental disorders. Psychiatric disorders 
would be understood as medical disorders, con-
tinuous with other bodily disorders studied in the 
biomedical sciences.
Kanaan and McGuire raise three challenges for 
fMRI as a way of uncovering neural mechanisms 
underpinning psychiatric disorders. These concern 
problems with task choice, statistical power, and 
interpretation of fMRI results. Task choice is the 
problem that, because of the nature of psychiatric 
disorders, it is hard to get a meaningful or sharp 
contrast between ‘ill’ and ‘normal’ behavior from 
patients in an fMRI scanner. Statistical power is 
the problem that psychiatric disorders tend to 
involve fMRI measurements with a low signal-
to-noise ratio, and small or heterogeneous groups 
of patients, which produces results of dubious 
statistical significance. The interpretation problem 
is that scans of psychiatric patients are open to a 
variety of interpretations, but unlike fMRI scans 
of normal subjects, the assumptions relied on to 
select the correct interpretation may not hold 
true in psychiatric cases. Given these three prob-
lems, fMRI is far from a straightforward tool for 
identifying the neural mechanisms involved in a 
psychiatric disorder.
At least as we would wish it, the logic of fMRI 
is that it allows one to see the regions of the brain 
sufficient for a given cognitive function. The lesson 
from Kanaan and McGuire is that in practice fMRI 
can rarely deliver a clear or unequivocal answer to 
the sufficiency question. I wish to press a different 
source of worry: whether it is even possible for a 
(perfect) brain scanner to reveal the mechanisms 
sufficient for a psychiatric disorder. The inference 
from an fMRI scan to a mechanism for a given cog-
nitive function depends on the neural sufficiency 
assumption. This is the assumption that neural 
activity (of some kind or other) is sufficient for 
the cognitive process or state in question to occur. 
The neural sufficiency assumption guarantees that 
the mechanism involved in a cognitive function 
lies within the neural domain. If the mechanism 
underpinning that cognitive function were to fall 
in part outside that neural domain, or if it were 
to involve interactions between the neural and 
non-neural environments, then fMRI (or any other 
brain scanner) would be unable to capture it.
In recent years, there has been increasing doubt 
that neural sufficiency is always and everywhere 
true for mental states and processes. The mecha-
nisms underlying at least some mental processes 
appear ineliminably to involve the way in which 
the brain couples to certain props and features in 
the environment. These cognitive mechanisms do 
not seem to be explicable in internal neural terms. 
I wish to suggest that at least some of the cogni-
tive mechanisms involved in mental disorders fall 
under this type. Hence, even if Kanaan and Mc-
Guire’s worries about fMRI could be addressed, 
an in principle barrier to using a brain scanner to 
identify the mechanisms of psychiatric disorders 
may exist, and hence a barrier to effecting the re-
duction of psychiatric disorders to neural disorders 
envisioned by cognitive neuropsychiatry.
Hurley (1998) presents a tempting picture of 
the mind she thinks we should resist called the 
input-output picture. The input-output picture 
understands cognitive activity as roughly a linear 
flow in which the senses deliver input, which is 
progressively processed by perceptual and cogni-
tive resources, resulting in an output (usually a 
motor action), and then the whole process repeats. 
This picture views cognitive mechanisms as being 
essentially located after sensory input and before 
motor output. Because sensation and motor ac-
tivity lie at neural interfaces, it seems natural to 
assume that cognitive mechanisms must lie some-
where in the neural circuitry between: sensation 
and motor activity bookend the neural boundary, 
and cognition is an intermediate step, so presum-
ably cognition must be neural. What else could 
cognition be other than a neural process? And 
if cognitive mechanisms are neural mechanisms, 
then to the extent psychiatric disorders are cogni-
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tive disorders, they are naturally understood as 
disorders in neural functioning.
A number of objections have appeared to the 
input-output picture and the neural sufficiency 
assumption that it motivates.1 A common thread 
in these objections is that to construe the environ-
ment, as the input-output picture does, as mere 
input to, or output of, a cognitive process seriously 
underestimates the role of environmental props 
in cognitive mechanisms. Dynamic feedback and 
feedforward loops run through the agent’s percep-
tual, cognitive, motor systems, body and worldly 
props, and a description of how the entire loop 
behaves over time is often necessary to identify a 
cognitive mechanism. Cognitive agents actively 
structure their world, and those structures play a 
crucial role in their cognitive processes, which in 
turn guides further structuring. In many cases, the 
environment is not just an input; it is an essential 
part of the cognitive processing. Neural mecha-
nisms combine, often in unexpected ways, with 
environmental props to get the job of cognition 
done. The mechanism involved often cannot be 
adequately described purely in terms of brain-side 
activity plus a specification of input and output. 
It may be difficult or impossible to explain the 
cognitive mechanism unless one tells a story that 
shows how neural resources and the environment 
couple together to achieve successful cognition. A 
brain-side story alone simply does not capture the 
cognitive mechanism.
Here is an example of the intended explanatory 
contrast. Consider the task of catching a fly ball 
in baseball (Clark 2008). This task involves what 
seems to be a cognitive/perceptual achievement, 
that is, working out where to stand to catch the 
ball. One might seek to explain this cognitive 
achievement in terms of internal mechanisms that 
make the relevant calculation of where to stand, 
for example, neural mechanisms that predict 
the ball’s future trajectory based on its observed 
position and velocity. In this case, the cognitive 
competence would be explained purely in terms 
of internal neural mechanisms. However, it turns 
out that this form of explanation, at least in this 
instance, is wrong: the mechanism involved in suc-
cessfully catching a baseball is not wholly neural. 
The mechanism involves neural activity working 
together with the environment in a loop. The 
mechanism seems to be as follows: a fielder runs so 
that her optical image of the ball presents a linear 
constant speed movement against her visual field 
(McBeath et al. 1995). This exploits an invariant 
in the optic flow, and by following this rule, the 
fielder is sure to arrive at the right place to catch 
the ball. Her mechanism for working out where 
to stand to catch the ball involves a combination 
of neural resources, bodily motion, and environ-
ment working together over time. Whereas the 
first explanatory model assumed that what lay 
behind our cognitive achievement was an internal 
mechanism, and in principle we could find that 
mechanism somewhere in the brain (if only we 
could fit a brain scanner to a moving outfielder!), 
on the second model, the cognizing involved has 
to be explained in terms of a wider loop involving 
brain, body, and world. A brain-side story alone 
is insufficient to explain the mechanism underpin-
ning solution of the cognitive task.
Another example is how players select their 
words in Scrabble (Clark and Chalmers 1998; 
Kirsh 1995). Players use physical rearrangement of 
their letter tiles to prompt word recall during play, 
which in turn prompts further rearrangements of 
the tiles, prompting further word recall, and so on. 
This mechanism achieves a cognitive competence 
that is not available by purely internal thought. 
Here, the player’s deliberation in choosing words 
is not just a matter of internal cognition. The delib-
eration process spills out into the world to include 
the player’s interaction with the physical letter 
tiles. The tiles are not just net inputs or outputs to 
an internal deliberation process, they are part of 
the processing mechanism. This mechanism could 
be divided into neural and non-neural parts, but 
that may not be particularly desirable or helpful in 
explaining how the cognitive task gets done. Ap-
peal to the whole mechanism is typically the best 
way to explain the player’s cognitive competence. 
A brain scanner, even if attached to a player during 
play, would not be able to reveal the mechanism 
behind her word choice.
A natural thought one might have about these 
cases is to insist that only the neural part of the 
cognitive processes deserves to be called the ‘cog-
nitive mechanism’, and everything else should be 
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understood as mere input or output.2 This move 
deserves more consideration than can be given 
here, but one immediate problem it faces in this 
context is that it cuts against the explanatory in-
terests that motivate talk of cognitive mechanisms 
in the first place. Typically, we want an explana-
tion for why certain behavior, thoughts, and 
beliefs tend to occur: a mechanism for how they 
are generated. This is, perhaps above all else, the 
motivation for positing cognitive mechanisms. As 
illustrated above, an answer does not need to be 
based, as the input-output model assumes, around 
citing a process that lies causally upstream of ac-
tion and downstream of perception. A behavior, 
thought, or belief can be the result of an on-going 
loop between brain, body, and environment. In 
these cases, an explanation of how a behavior, 
thought, or belief tends to occur involves the whole 
mechanism. If one chooses to call this wider pro-
cess not a ‘cognitive mechanism’, but reserve that 
expression only for its neural part, that does not 
alter the fact that our aims in explaining cogni-
tion will not be served by a purely internal story. 
Consequently, restricting the title ‘cognitive’ to 
neural activity alone would only achieve a pyrrhic 
victory in this context: it preserves the letter of the 
neural sufficiency assumption, but concedes that it 
is drained of its power to explain how a cognitive 
system works. On either view then, consideration 
of exclusively neural mechanisms does not reveal 
the mechanisms that explain our cognitive activity.
Not all cognitive processes are environment-
involving in the way suggested. However, I wish to 
suggest that at least some of the cognitive processes 
involved in psychiatric disorders are. An embed-
ded model explains how external resources work 
together with neural activity to produce cognitive 
and behavioral deficits. It helps to explain why 
psychiatric illnesses are often tied to interactions 
with specific environmental props or features of 
the subject’s body. It also helps to explain at least 
one of the difficulties encountered in fMRI scan-
ning described by Kanaan and McGuire: trying to 
illicit the right, characteristically ‘ill’, behavior or 
thoughts from a patient in the alien environment of 
the scanner. If the cognitive malfunction involved 
in that the disorder is environment-involving, one 
would expect difficulties reproducing it inside a 
scanner. 
So what would an embedded model of psychia-
try look like?
Consider two hypothetical models of aging. 
One is the model of a master clock (or indeed 
multiple clocks) inside the organism that gradu-
ally run down. As the clock advances, the organ-
ism ages. A natural thought to prolong life is to 
somehow slow down, or stop, the internal clock. 
An alternative model is based on an analogy with 
how elderly cars age (Hayflick 1999). The thought 
is that small failures inside a car’s mechanism may, 
by themselves, be untroubling, but these small 
failures are exacerbated by repeatedly coming into 
contact both with each other, other components 
of the car, and an uncooperative environment. 
The ongoing interaction between these elements 
can grow what initially seem to be small failures 
in large and unexpected directions, and place 
them beyond the ability of a repair mechanism to 
fix. The malfunctioning here does not involve a 
single localizable internal failure, but is the result 
of any number of internal abnormalities that are 
supported, and reinforced, by the feedback the car 
receives from its environment.
The fMRI dream of psychiatric imaging follows 
roughly the master-clock model. Psychiatric dis-
orders are a matter of one (or more) neurological 
functional failures. The dream is that taxonomiz-
ing, diagnosing, and treating the disorder can be 
done in terms of taxonomizing, diagnosing, and 
treating the underlying neurological failures. An 
embedded account of psychiatric disorders would 
follow roughly the elderly car model. Psychiatric 
disorders may not have a single identifiable internal 
malfunction. Rather, they are the product of small, 
perhaps otherwise untroubling, internal misfunc-
tions, that jostling together, and being reinforced 
by an uncooperative environment, snowball, and 
contribute to wider breakdown. Just as the failure 
of an elderly car cannot be pinpointed to a single, 
localizable failure in a component, so the malfunc-
tioning in a major psychiatric disorder may not 
be localizable to a given brain region or function. 
What has gone wrong is that, for any number of 
reasons, the whole organism-environment loop 
has been thrown out of kilter, and that can cause, 
and exacerbate, errors in any portion of the loop. 
Indeed, it would be reasonable to expect multiple 
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deficiencies both brain-side and environment-side. 
Curing the problem, even in an ideal case, may not 
be as simple as achieving correct neural function-
ing in a given functional brain region. Somehow, 
the whole organism-environment loop needs to 
get back on track to function correctly, and this 
may involve treatment of multiple problems both 
brain-side and environment-side.
On this view, one would not expect necessarily 
to identify a single characteristic region or func-
tional neural group co-occurring with a complex 
psychiatric disorder. All manner of neural malfunc-
tions, when coupled with a recalcitrant environ-
ment, may produce similar symptoms. Just as two 
old cars can have different patterns of internal 
problems that cause their mechanisms to fail, so 
two patients may exhibit similar clinical profiles, 
but have different neurological conditions. The 
embedded model, therefore, casts doubt not just 
on the claim that we can reduce the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in psychiatric disorders to 
neural mechanisms, but also on the weaker claim 
that we will necessarily find consistent markers 
for those disorders within the neural domain. Just 
as psychiatric disorders generally lack a pathog-
nomonic neuropathology, we may find they also 
lack a pathognomonic neurofunctional pathology.
It is worth emphasizing that I am not saying 
that brain malfunction does not play an essen-
tial role in mental illness, or that fMRI cannot 
enhance our understanding the mechanisms of 
mental illness. My claim is that fMRI may only 
be part of the story by uncovering the brain-side 
mechanisms involved in mental illness. The posi-
tive proposal is that the mechanism involved in 
a cognitive malfunction has parts both in the 
environment and in the brain, and these need to 
be seen as working in concert to effect any kind 
of mechanistic reduction.
This only sketches how a model of psychiatric 
disorders might take into account the embedded 
nature of the mind. The concerns fuel Kanaan 
and McGuire’s conclusion that “psychiatric fMRI 
has nowhere firm to plant its feet” (XX). If the 
concerns raised here are valid, we should not be 
surprised, or troubled, by this conclusion. On the 
assumption that psychiatric disorders ineliminably 
involve not just the brain, but the way in which 
the brain is coupled to the environment, it should 
be no surprise that brain scanning is not sufficient 
to understand their pathology. Failures can occur, 
not just in a characteristic functional brain area, 
but anywhere in the loop that extends between the 
brain and the environment. Once failure in one 
part of that loop occurs, one should expect more 
and more brain-side and world-side malfunctions. 
Major psychiatric disorders, if reducible at all, 
may only be reducible to a snowballing pattern 
of internal and external failures.
Notes
1.Concerns arise from a variety of perspectives and 
cognitive domains, see Clark and Chalmers (1998), 
Clark (2008), Dennett (1996), Haugeland (1998), 
Hurley (1998) Hutchins (1995), Menary (2007), Noë 
(2004), Rowlands (2003, 2006), Sprevak (2009, 2010), 
Wheeler (2005), Wilson (2004).
2.See Rupert (2004, 2009) for a sophisticated de-
velopment of this response, and Sprevak (2010) for a 
discussion.
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